The general mitigating and aggravating circumstances of criminal liability are elements attached to the crime that, when they occur, affect the punishment quantum. Cuban criminal legislation provides a catalog of such circumstances and some general conditions for their application. Such norms give judges broad discretion in assessing circumstances and adjusting punishment based on the intensity of those circumstances. In the interest of broad judicial discretion, the law does not establish specific ways for measuring circumstances’ intensity. This gives judges more freedom (...) and autonomy, but it also imposes on them more social responsibility and challenges them to manage the uncertainty and subjectivity inherent in this complex activity. This paper proposes a model to aid the linguistic assessment of circumstances’ intensity and to provide linguistic and numerical recommendations to determine an appropriate punishment interval. M-LAMAC determines the collective evaluation of circumstances of the same type, determines the prevalence of a type of circumstance by means of a compensation function, recommends the required modification in the input interval, and finally recommends a numerical interval adjusted to the judges’ initially expressed preferences. The model’s applicability is demonstrated by means of several experiments on a fictitious case of bank document forgery. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to study and analyze innovative technologies for the reproduction of the socio-cultural potential of students in a music college. The scientific novelty of the research consists in identifying and substantiating the interrelations in the process of social reproduction, which provides innovative educational and educational activities in a music college. As a result, the authors have developed a technology of social audit of the process of reproduction of the socio-cultural potential of youth in a music (...) college. The technologization of the process made it possible to develop a model for managing the reproductive processes of the socio-cultural potential of college youth based on the principles of a project-oriented approach. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to reveal the genesis of the concept of digital reality and its connection with the millennial Pyphagorean tradition in European philosophy and culture, based on the logic and dialectic of the number as a metaphysical entity. The article implements an attempt to historically and philosophically consider the phenomenon of digital reality: the conclusions of modern researchers are confirmed about the key importance of this philosophical tradition as a special system of thought, which defined modern (...) ideological and scientific paradigms and contributed to the formation of the social model of post-industrial, information-digital society. Scientific novelty is to reveal a modern scientific understanding of the notion that numbers can materialize the world by reflecting reality and returning it to man through knowledge derived through the programming or construction of digital reality on the basis of symbolic-applied logic. As a result of the analysis of philosophical sources, it has been proved that information in our world can be considered as another kind of movement of matter, and the Internet is not only an "information technology" but a "social form", a "universal social space" that appeared not overnight – with the invention of "breakthrough" technology, but formed by centuries of cultivated scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In a series of reports the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations has emphasized a tripartite framework regarding business and human rights that includes the state “duty to protect,” the TNC “responsibility to respect,” and “appropriate remedies” for human rights violations. This article examines the recent history of UN initiatives regarding business and human rights and places the tripartite framework in historical context. Three approaches to human rights are distinguished: moral, political, and legal. (...) It is argued that the tripartite framework’s grounding of the responsibility of TNCs to respect human rights is properly understood as moral and not merely as a political or legal duty. A moral account of the duty of TNCs to respect basic human rights is defended and contrasted with a merely strategic approach. The main conclusion of the article is that only a moral account of the basic human rights duties of TNCs provides a sufficiently deep justification of “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights” feature of the tripartite framework. (shrink)

We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies (...) in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description‐independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Little theoretical attention has been paid to the question of what obligations corporations and other business enterprises have to the four billion people living at the base of the global economic pyramid. This article makes several theoretical contributions to this topic. First, it is argued that corporations are properly understood as agents of global justice. Second, the legitimacy of global governance institutions and the legitimacy of corporations and other business enterprises are distinguished. Third, it is argued that a deliberative democracy (...) model of corporate legitimacy defended by theorists of political CSR is unsatisfactory. Fourth, it is argued that a Rawlsian theoretical framework fails to provide a satisfactory account of the obligations of corporations regarding global justice. Finally, an ethical conception of CSR grounded in an appropriately modest set of duties tied to corporate relationships is then defended. This position is cosmopolitan in scope and grounded in overlapping arguments for human rights. (shrink)

Most shoppers like bargains. Do bargains come at the expense of workers in sweatshops around the world? The authors argue that many large multinational corporations are running the moral equivalents of sweatshops and are not properly respecting the rights of persons. They list a set of minimum standards of safety and decency that they claim all corporations should meet (and that many are not). Finally, they defend their call for improved working conditions by replying to objections that meeting improved conditions (...) will cause greater harm than good, even to the workers themselves. They consider many specifi c corporations and name names and point the finger at various forms of disrespect for persons, along the way. (shrink)

"The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).

ABSTRACT:We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

Several notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between [Formula: see text] principles have been studied. This paper contributes to the program of analyzing the behavior of versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and related principles under these notions. Among other results, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an instance of RT[Formula: see text] all of whose solutions have PA degree over [Formula: see text] and use this to show that König’s Lemma lies strictly between RT[Formula: see text] and RT[Formula: see (...) text] under one of these notions. We also answer two questions raised by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer on comparing versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and of the Thin Set Theorem with the same exponent but different numbers of colors. Still on the topic of the effect of the number of colors on the computable aspects of Ramsey-theoretic properties, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an [Formula: see text]-coloring [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] such that every [Formula: see text]-coloring of [Formula: see text] has an infinite homogeneous set that does not compute any infinite homogeneous set for [Formula: see text], and connect this result with the notion of infinite information reducibility introduced by Dzhafarov and Igusa. Next, we introduce and study a new notion that provides a uniform version of the idea of implication with respect to [Formula: see text]-models of RCA0, and related notions that allow us to count how many applications of a principle [Formula: see text] are needed to reduce another principle to [Formula: see text]. Finally, we fill in a gap in the proof of Theorem 12.2 in Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman. (shrink)

The concept of the environment appears to be indispensably involved in adaptive explanation. Quite what its role is, however, is a matter of some dispute. The environment is customarily viewed as the dual of the organism; a wholly external, discrete, autonomous cause of evolution. On this view, the external environment is the principal cause of the adaptedness of form, and the determinant of what it is to be an adaptation. I argue that this conception of the environment neither adequately explains (...) nor individuates evolutionary adaptations. Instead, adaptation, properly construed, is an evolutionary response to affordances. The environment, traditionally construed, underdetermines an organism’s affordances. Instead, I argue that the environment takes its place in evolutionary models not as a discrete causal entity, but as an abstraction. (shrink)

After providing a brief history of global climate change, we consider and reject the influential position that free markets and responsive democracies relieve corporations of obligations to protect the environment. Five main objections to the free market view are presented, focusing in particular on the roles of business organizations in the transportation and electricity generation sectors. Ethically grounded management and public policy recommendations are offered.

Good explanations are not only true or probably true, but are also relevant to a causal question. Current models of causal explanation either only address the question of the truth of an explanation, or do not distinguish the probability of an explanation from its relevance. The tasks of scenario construction and conversational explanation are distinguished, which in turn shows how scenarios can interact with conversational principles to determine the truth and relevance of explanations. The proposed model distinguishes causal discounting from (...) causal backgrounding , and makes predictions concerning the differential effects of contextual information about alternative explanations on: (a) the kind of mental models constructed; (b) belief revision about probable cause; and (c) the perceived quality of a focal explanation. Four experiments are reported that test these predictions. The significance of the notion of explanatory relevance for research on causal explanation is then discussed. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that evolution is a chance process, an idea found in popular writings on evolution, but also in academic writing in a broad range of scientific disciplines: scientific, philosophical and theological. One problem is that words such as ‘chance’ and ‘random’ are used with a range of different meanings according to context, and in evolutionary biology the word ‘chance’ is sometimes used in a way that is different from its use in mathematics and philosophy. The present article (...) aims to clarify the range of meanings and to argue the case that the evolutionary process is far from being a ‘theory of chance’ from biological, mathematical, or indeed philosophical and theological perspectives. (shrink)

Three‐ to 4‐month‐old infants show asymmetric exclusivity in the acquisition of cat and dog perceptual categories. The cat perceptual category excludes dog exemplars, but the dog perceptual category does not exclude cat exemplars. We describe a connectionist autoencoder model of perceptual categorization that shows the same asymmetries as infants. The model predicts the presence of asymmetric retroactive interference when infants acquire cat and dog categories sequentially. A subsequent experiment conducted with 3‐ to 4‐month‐olds verifies the predicted pattern of looking time (...) behaviors. We argue that bottom‐up, associative learning systems with distributed representations are appropriate for modeling the operation of short‐term visual memory in early perceptual category learning. (shrink)

Spinoza discovered and studied Descartes's philosophy at the school of Van den Enden and then at the University of Leiden. Spinoza is seen as providing metaphysical views of unparalleled audacity, which remain highly exciting and offer a source of inspiration and a source of theoretical models in a wide variety of fields, including neurobiology. The most general of Spinoza's intentions is to expound in accordance with “the prolix Geometric order” what Descartes had left in a more informal one. Spinoza's original (...) distance from Cartesian conceptions, before becoming obvious in the metaphysical views of the Ethics, is already noticeable in the TIE. In metaphysics, the Spinoza‐Descartes relationship is complex, but cannot be said to take the form of an implicit dialogue or a community of inspiration. Descartes's emphasis on the use of free will, the gap between the two authors in matters of moral anthropology is therefore quite limited. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAccording to difference-based models of causal judgement, the epistemic state of the agent should not affect judgements of cause. Four experiments examined opportunity chains in which a physical event enabled a subsequent proximal cause to produce an outcome. All four experiments showed that when the proximal cause was a human action, it was judged as more causal if the agent was aware of his opportunity than if he was not or if the proximal cause was a physical event. The first (...) two experiments showed that these preferences could not be explained in terms of differences in perceived conditional probability, social controllability or perceptions of the causal sequence as forming a single unit. The third experiment showed that awareness affected the perceived deliberateness with which the action brought the outcome about but not its perceived voluntariness. The fourth experiment showed that... (shrink)

Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have...

Whole brain failure constitutes the diagnostic criterion for death determination in most clinical settings across the globe. Yet the conceptual foundation for its adoption was slow to emerge, has evoked extensive scientific debate since inception, underwent policy revision, and remains contentious in praxis even today. Complications result from the need to relate a unitary construal of the death event with an adequate account of organismal integration and that of the human organism in particular. Advances in the neuroscience of higher human (...) faculties, such as the self, personal identity, and consciousness, and dynamical philosophy of science accounts, however, are yielding a portrait of higher order global integration shared between body and brain. Such conceptual models of integration challenge a praxis relying exclusively on a neurological criterion for death. (shrink)

Voir, entendre, toucher, ce n'est pas simplement avoir des sensations. La perception nous donne à voir, entendre, toucher quelque chose. Mais que perçoit-on au juste ? Des choses, des faits, des apparences ? En quel sens et à quelles conditions perçoit-on des objets ? Quelle part y prend le sujet percevant ? L'objectivation perceptuelle est-elle essentiellement conceptuelle ? Le présent ouvrage explore ces questions et tente d'y répondre à travers une confrontation avec plusieurs grands moments de la théorie de la (...) perception au XXe siècle : la phénoménologie husserlienne, la psychologie gestaltiste, l'internalisme de Searle, les débats contemporains autour des contenus perceptuels. Centré sur la question de l'intentionnalité de la perception sensible, il poursuit trois objectifs principaux : défendre un dualisme phénoménal de la passivité sensorielle et de l'activité attentionnelle, en opposition aux théories monistes de la perception ; tenter de réhabiliter, de reformuler et de réactualiser le problème de l'analyse de l'expérience ; esquisser enfin une solution d'ensemble au problème du rapport entre l'expérience et la pensée conceptuelle. (shrink)

The Social Scientist's Bestiary addresses a number of important theoretical and philosophical issues in the social sciences from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. It is intended to guide social scientists - researchers, teachers and students - so that they will not fall victim to the beasts they will encounter in the course of their enquiries. Such beasts include holism, post-positivistic work in the philosophy of science, Kuhnian relativism, the denial of objectivity, hermeneutics and several others, both good and (...) bad. (shrink)

I critically discuss both the particular doctrinal and general meta-philosophical or methodological tenets of Mark Johnston's paper "Human Beings", attending to several weaknesses in his argument. One of the most important amongst them is an apparent reliance on a substitution of identicals within an intensional context as he argues that continuity of functioning brain is essential to the persistence of "Human Beings" as allegedly singled out by his methodology; another equally important is a simple lacuna in place of an argument (...) that candidate entities for re-identification by means we take for granted in the case of persons cannot be what I call "mentalistically" individuated. (shrink)

The project of articulating a theological ethics on the basis of liturgical anthropology is bound to fail if the necessary consequence is that one has to quit the forum of critical modern rationality. The risk of Engelhardt's approach is to limit rationality to a narrow vision of reason. Sin is not to be understood as the negation of human holiness, but as the negation of divine holiness. The only way to renew theological ethics is to understand sin as the anthropological (...) and ethical expression of the biblical message of the justification by faith only. Sin is therefore a secondary category, which can only by interpreted in light of the positive manifestation of liberation, justification, and grace. The central issue of Christian ethics is not ritual purity or morality, but experience, confession and recognition of our own injustice in our dealing with God and men. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 1, Page 109-135, February 2021.

Care has increasingly been promoted as an element of successful management practice. However, an ethic of care is a normative theory that was initially developed in reference to intimate relationships, and it is unclear if it is an appropriate normative standard in business. The purpose of this review is to bridge the social scientific study of care with philosophical understandings of care and to provide a theoretical justification for care as a managerial value. We review the three different forms of (...) care advanced by the ethics literature: caring relations, organizational care, and care as a virtue. We compare these forms of care to the management litertature. In doing so, we integrate what has previously been a scattered, yet growing, body of research on care. Our review of the literature reveals that care has increasingly been studied in management in relation to an ethic of care. Yet, many of the properties of care have also played a role in other established research domains (e.g., leadership). We discuss and critique the management and ethics literatures on care, paying attention to areas of agreement or disagreeement between the two. We go on to provide a normative justification of care as a value in business. Finally, we close by suggesting directions for future research. (shrink)

Meu principal objetivo, neste artigo, é analisar o problema da justificação moral para John Rawls, caracterizando a teoria da justiça como equidade como um sistema coerentista de justificação que conta com uma epistemologia coerentista holística, uma teoria do contrato social que introduz uma ontologia social e uma estratégia pragmatista de justificação na teoria contratualista. No escopo deste trabalho, examinarei o pressuposto pragmatista de justificação na teoria do contrato social, o qual faz uso do argumento da estabilidade social e legitimidade política (...) para garantir a validade da regra, isto é, dos princípios de justiça, a partir de dois artigos centrais para este debate: "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" e "Reply to Habermas" § 1, 2. Um objetivo específico será o de mostrar a complementaridade entre o descritivismo e o prescritivismo nessa estratégia de justificação que possibilita a superação da dicotomia entre fato e valor. My main aim in this paper is to analyze the problem of moral justification in John Rawls, characterizing the theory of justice as fairness as a coherentist system of justification that relies on a holistic coherentist epistemology, a social contract theory that introduces a social ontology, and a pragmatist strategy of justification in contractarian theory. I will analyze the core characteristics of the pragmatic presupposition of justification in social contract theory, which uses the argument of social stability and political legitimacy as a guarantee of the legitimacy of the rules, that is, of the principles of justice. I will mainly make use of two articles relevant to this debate: "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" and "Reply to Habermas" § 1, 2. A specific objective here is to show the complementarity between descriptivism and prescriptivism in this strategy of justification that allows an overcoming the fact/value dichotomy. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a teoria da justiça de Aristóteles elaborada na Ethica Nicomachea, Livro V, a partir de um certo deslocamento em relação à teoria das virtudes, que faz uso da escolha deliberada do agente, para utilizar-se de critérios mais objetivos baseados na igualdade, em que se encontram aspectos universalistas e procedimentais na constituição dos princípios de justiça na esfera pública, visando identificar uma complementaridade entre uma ética das virtudes e uma ética dos princípios na filosofia prática (...) aristotélica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Aristóteles. Ética das virtudes. Ética dos princípios. Teoria da justiça. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendo mostrar a importância do conceito de razoável na teoria da justiça como equidade, de John Rawls e também, explicar o problema da razoabilidade nessa teoria. O ponto de partida será ressaltar a exigência de razoabilidade que é feita ao agente moral na justiça como equidade. Posteriormente, procurarei identificar algumas críticas a esse critério. Partirei da crítica formulada por Estlund a respeito do estreitamento do conceito de razoabilidade e a necessidade da verdade e das críticas estabelecidas por Timmons (...) e Gaus sobre a exigência demasiada e ineficaz da razoabilidade. O passo seguinte será tentar responder a essas críticas formuladas e, na parte final do texto, procurarei estipular um argumento a respeito de um tipo de responsabilidade moral razoável que pode estar contida na justiça como equidade. (shrink)